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Exhibit A19 to C. Cramer Declaration

EXHIBIT 28

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Let's talk about our business model... Case 3:21-md-02981-JD Document 325-3 Filed 08/19/22 Page 4 of 97

Why we're here

Assess current situation

Take a step back and see the larger picture

Discuss big ideas and implications


goal: Agree on how we want to shape the future

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The daily Android / Play vocabulary...

Cloudgaming Instantapps Discovery Tencent Kids Billing Subscription Samsung Premiumgames Stadia Regulations Huawei Unity Crossplatform Gameengines Policy Emulators
Security Chat RSA esports
Malware

Dumbledore



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Let's take a step back...

G

The 50,000 foot view:


Android reaches lots of people + Google distributes its apps Google invests back some part of proceeds to improve and grow Android

Play is the preeminent app store within Android

Game and app developers BUILD for Android and choose PLAY to reach these users

Play makes \$ (primarily IAP) through strength in its distribution

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Partner incentives today are focused on search...

SEARCH

\$25B

\$2.9B

(+26% y/y)

2018 Android Revenue 2018 Rev Share Payments

)

PAID TO BOTH DEMS AND CARRIERS
BUYS US SEARCH ACCESS POINTS AND
INCREMENTAL PROTECTIONS

PLAY

\$7B

(+17% y/y)


2018 Play Revenue \$0.8B


2018 DCB Payments

)

PAID TO ONLY CARRIERS

BUYS US A FOP; NO INCREMENTAL PROTECTIONS FOR SEARCH OR PLAY





So why are we talking about this again now?

Pressure on the 70% rev-share "tax"


Developers reaching the end of the mobile gold-rush / pushing for higher share (may result in regulatory pressure)


Android / app-store consolidation

Single OEMs (e.g. Samsung) or groups of OEMS (e.g. Aptoide on XOV) are building significant distribution scale

Game developer consolidation

Single developers consolidating a large number of highly monetizing titles, increasing risk of going-it-alone





All are direct margin dilutive, which makes us think...



Should we be doing all of them? Is it a question of phasing? Put our biggest bet behind one or two?



Is there some broader solve that we haven't thought about?



WHAT DO WE START DOING NOW TO BUILD NEW REVENUE MODELS?

There's other revenue available in gaming...

Development

Form-factor extension

Distribution

Engagement


- IDE/Game Engines/Kits (Unity, Epic, etc.)
- Prototyping services
- Pre-release funding
- Beta communities, QA, Monetization testing
- Etc.


- Form-factor extension / emulation
- Streaming


- Social (Discord, etc.)
- LiveOps services
- Esports assets
- Etc.

As we do any of these, there's a decision to make: is this a way of further defending the 30% rate, or a new way of making money?










Services that help games run across mobile, PC and console. Emulation/streaming represent different distribution methods towards bringing mobile games to PCs



More competitive games are coming to Android - not pay to win, strategy is around building audiences through esports competitions. Discovery outside the ecosystem.

Social remains important - it's still hard to find someone to play with, and it's all about the communities a game forms around them (and less about individual friends)

Device Fragmentation / OEM Complexity

Epic Says Android is Too Inconsistent to Develop For Compared to iOS

+3,767 f 🕥 🕁 🕂 🖂


"... problem is the tweaks that OEMs make to the internals of Android. For example... [Samsung S8 vs. Pixel 2]... both devices have around 4GB of RAM, but 1.2GB less of it was usable on the Pixel 2!"




BD Predictions in 2020

What will be the 3 most common asks from partners in 2020?

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
How big is Google Play's

Gaming business
today?

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



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Ecosystem Players


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Amazon - Services oriented, developer stack. Twitch harnesses game communities. (why? Because core biz is AWS/retail)

Microsoft's expertise in PC and console gaming combined with Azure generating a shift towards cloud gaming in Fall 2019




Key gaming assets & strategy

- Xbox: Primary gaming console business likely to evolve into portable/mobile hybrid, similar to Switch, and include cloud gaming at its core. Through Xbox Live, they also offer community-centric features, including a mobile app
- Windows: Leading PC OS and preferred platform for PC developers and gamers. Merging Windows and Xbox OS, further reinforcing their gaming ecosystems and enabling Xbox Play Anywhere x-platform gaming strategy (only supports ~10% of titles today)
- 3. Microsoft Studios: In-house developer / publisher with strong IP (Minecraft, Halo, and Age of Empires) to drive gamer adoption of Xbox, Windows. Some titles (e.g. Minecraft) available across platforms today (including on Play)
- 4. Azure: Microsoft is developing a cloud gaming business powered by Azure to double down on services for game developers. Announced cloud streaming partnership with Sony (PlayStation) for joint development and content creation around next-gen console releas cycle (Fall 2019)


Sources: Darlista Microsoft Revenue, Forbes Microsoft Cloud; Your Companion App, Your Play Anywhere, MSFT + Sony Partnership; Note: Indudes MSOffice products

Google

Confidential + Proprietary





Apple - will be for games, what they are for music. All apple devices are effectively game oriented phones. (why? Because core is biz is HW. Camera focus will be less of a differentiator, games will be their future diff)



Tencent as examples (core biz is VC - owns all the top game developers, owns stake in social products (WeChat), and "owns" China... bring together pieces through investment)

Valve's success in PC distribution comes from their focus on creating the best gamer






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Exhibit A20 to C. Cramer Declaration

EXHIBIT 29



	Play: Chinese OEMs have alternative stores preloaded on ~80% of Android devices, and have a meaningful overlap with Play offering; Huawei working on their own OS Samsung ramped up investments into their own store with S10 launch If Play is less relevant for OEMs, MADA protections may be at risk (leading to higher TAC) Apps/ Clean UI Chinese OEMs have ~90% services overlap with GMS apps and are at an inflection point on expanding their services outside China & India, e.g. iOS users expect cohesive set of services incl. Messages, Photos, Music, Mail, etc. and view lack of unified offering on Android as a deterrent for switching Android reach Android share is under pressure in US (lost 6ppt in 2018; 2% DAU decline), and developed markets where most of last year's Android gains were driven by Huawei; Huawei ban puts ~250M shipments at risk over 2yrs
Partner overview	We plan to move all current RSA partners to GDAF over the next 2 years. We see the highest urgency to switch i to stock UI as they are at a critical decision point for their services expansion outside India (where they monetize these aggressively, earning an estimated I in revenue in 2018).
Financial summary	Aggregate over the 2-year deal term (2020-2021 figures below), Search revenue share of (TAC) Play revenue share of I, to be paid out as revenue share or lump NRE payment At steady state in 2023 (full ramp of coverage), Annual Search revenue share of (TAC) Annual Play revenue share of (TAC) Annual Play revenue share of (TAC) Compared to status quo, aggregate over the 2-year time period (2020-2021 below), incremental payment, driven by: Increased device enrollment Mix shift Increase in revenue share rate Carriers: Introduction of Play payment \$133M, to be paid out as revenue share or lump NRE payment Compared to status quo, in steady state in 2023, incremental payment, driven by: Increased device enrollment Mix shift Increased device enrollment Mix shift Increase in revenue share rate Carriers: Introduction of Play payment, to be paid out as revenue share or lump NRE payment, to be paid out as revenue share or lump NRE payment
	Considering offering top strategic partners

Termination rights	Standard termination rights, no changes from RSA 2.0 Tiered exclusivity provisions	
Exclusivity		
Liability caps & indemnities	No changes to standard RSA terms	
Is your deal with, or implicate directly or indirectly, a special category of partners?	No	
Does this deal involve Assistant (OPA)?	Yes	
Is this deal with the customer/partner being negotiated jointly or in conjunction with another deal with the customer/partner in a separate product area?	No	
Does this deal commit Alphabet to spend money with or for this customer/partner?	No	

Risks and Mitigation

Risk	Mitigation	Accountable
increasing Google TAC		@


Financial overview



Success Metrics

% Devices covered with prot	rections for search, feed, Play and Assistant	
Expected Performance	Increase RSA device coverage from the current ~57% to 100%	
Date of Reporting Availability	2020-01-31	
Cross-Functional Stakeho	older Feedback	
Function Required stakeholders shown in green	Feedback / comments < <pre><<pre><<pre><<pre>please enter LDAP: please enter comments>></pre></pre></pre></pre>	
Sales / BD	Pros: Promotes a healthy partnership by creating go big scenarios Aligns incentives in an efficient way for our most strategic-partners Gives flexibility to partner to optimize for their own needs while giving Google key protections Cons: Redacted - Privilege	Comment [1]:
	 Incentives partners most in high monetizing countries, in lower monetizing countries we may need to strike bounty deals for other apps 	
Legal	Redacted - Privilege	

Finance (1) Increases Android device integrations with Search / Assistant / Google apps (e.g. GBoard, Comms) (2) GDAF incentivizes adoption of Google Forward phones with a clean UI. An analysis of Google Forward phone monetization in select European countries has shown positive revenue uplift (3-5 (3) Google forward tier offers a way to scale distribution of services that are otherwise secured via individual bounty deals, reducing overhead and at a discount in many cases. (4) There are tradeoffs in introducing Play revenue share to partners (cons below), but we believe benefits outweigh drawbacks: a) pays on Play for securing exclusivity, b) incentivizes CN partners at critical juncture to lean into Android to better compete against Apple. Cons (Risks & Mitigations): (1) Pays revenue share in EEA where we have user choice, but we will only pay when users choose Google, and increases the hurdle for rivals to block us out completely. (2) Increased margin and TAC pressure, but a) offers Search integration and Play exclusivity (thus protecting revenues), and b) provides partners more cash to better compete with Apple as device margins squeeze. Google Forward devices may drive search revenue uplift and cost savings from reduction in bounty deals. (3) Play revshare is currently unable to be tracked systematically and will require lead time to get setup. However, negotiations and device lead times will provide some buffer to get operationally setup. (4) Offering revenue share on Play will potentially expose how we monetize. We will mitigate by a) negotiating lump sum payments where we can, and b) grouping Search and Play revshare checks together to obfuscate. Pros: Product Secures exposed access points not protected by MADA (browser, assistant) on more devices Aligns rapidly growing CN OEMs with Google before they pass the pivotal moment in 1P services growth (e.g. Introduces a meaningful services revenue component for non Chinese OEMs to enable them to better compete in the Creates opportunity for Google and OEMs to collaborate on a cohesive services offering (powered by Google), and promotes Android and Google by advancing cleaner, more secure, fresher UX Ensures carriers are invested in Android's success Cons: Increases TAC and introduces a precedent for Play revenue May slow down individual app deals in the short run, which is mitigated by close coordination between Android and app BD teams



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FILE UNDER SEAL

Exhibit A21 to C. Cramer Declaration

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Exhibit A22 to C. Cramer Declaration

EXHIBIT 36

Boosting Top Game Developer Support & & Securing Play Distribution on Samsung Devices

April 9, 2019

ATTORNEY CLIENT PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL // REFLECTS LEGAL ADVICE

CONTENTS

Executive Summary

Context & Mobile Gaming Trends

Risks


Program Proposals

- Top Game Developers
- 2. Samsung

Financial Summary

AC PRIVILEGED // REFLECTS LEGAL ADVICE

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


Both programs are needed

Need to invest in top devs now to ensure imminent launches happen on Play and reduce noise Samsung is aggressively pursuing gaming, and indicated they're open to partnering with us (but a deal will take time to negotiate and implement)


Note: We're also beginning to explore ways to reduce 'app store tax' sentiment across the developer ecosystem, via new business model concepts


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





- HVUs: sof buyers spend
- Samsung concentration of reflect 2018 actuals. Concentration is even higher in few key Play markets, eg, KR








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





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Improve sentiment about (1) Play revenue share, (2) building high-fi games for Android, and (3) Google's gaming value proposition Android: reduced app distro fragmentation





Dev List

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More developers

-Piloting Build & Test & Launch packs with _____ good early traction


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


Note that P&L cost starts exceeding Cost to deliver value in 2020 & 2021 as increases

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Jamie / Jim

Proposal: strategic collaboration that advances Samsung goals, promotes Play on Samsung devices, and improves Android gaming experience


• Ads rev share from syndicated Google Ad products
• Co-marketing opportunities for Samsung-exclusive content and deals
• Up to \$10M in 'Play Points' discounts for 1 year for Samsung phone buyers
• Up to \$60M annual payment for 4 years
• Play hosts Galaxy Store games/apps, and provides billing, security, and updates
• Play and Galaxy Store are only app stores on Default Home Screen
• Samsung adheres to Android Gaming Standards

- We want to collaborate with Samsung and bring multiple levers (not just cash) to the table. Some levers are win-win (
- Upfront cash payment is needed to address their Galaxy store P&L. We are anchoring on the range of net profit that we estimate Galaxy store makes
- Potential upside from ads syndication would be lucrative for both Samsung and Google (size depends on how much Samsung is willing to partner wrt surfaces & ads targeting parameters). Samsung does not need to build its own large sales team and court devs. Can participate in the upside as several large publishers do today.
- Marketing opportunities:




Playpoints:


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


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
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


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


Marketing line includes and also accounts for incrementality from marketing spend

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Net Value: Mitigation - Investment




Play Revenue = Apps & Games + Ads on Play 2019 Assumptions:

Epic Store to launch Q4 2019

Risk from Samsung and Amazon store already underway with existing stores and already known co-listing of top developers (


A couple of partial exclusives off-play expected to occur in 2019 Play would still retain at least ~50% of the top developers in 2019 with most likely defection of top developers ramping up to 100% in 2020

https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1e7ZzdGpYZJIEhOIESEvrYINZ-M-6wptQwT8Alxyf4Ns/edit?ts=5c807718#gid=1323652187



Source sheet:

https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1e7ZzdGpYZJIEhOIESEvrYINZ-M-6wptQwT8Alxyf4Ns/edit?zx=5yg339kwdcpm#gid=1323652187



Source sheet:

https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1e7ZzdGpYZJIEhOIESEvrYINZ-M-6wptQwT8Alxyf4Ns/edit?zx=5yg339kwdcpm#gid=1323652187


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Source sheet:

https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1e7ZzdGpYZJIEhOIESEvrYINZ-M-6wptQwT8Alxyf4Ns/edit?zx=5yg339kwdcpm#gid=1323652187

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


Marketing line includes and also accounts for incrementality from marketing spend


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What about Unknown Sources?

- Developers have choice on Android (key distinction from Apple). Changes to 'Unknown Sources' create legal / regulatory challenges
- We want developers to actively choose Google, and we want happy customers
- Risk still remains even with changes to Unknown Sources
 - Worse developer sentiment; "app store tax" meme acceleration
 - Alternative stores can still be preloaded
 - Sideloading remains

Epic / Fortnite


Fortnite is active on ~6M Android devices

We estimate Fortnite would have been substantially more successful had they launched on Play

However, other developers might follow Epic's path for various reasons:

- Every developer that follows Epic's path & launches on the Epic store will have less friction & a larger addressable user base than title before it.
- Developers can afford to take a ~20% performance hit on Epic store (due to 88% rev share) and still break-even. Or a ~30% hit in performance if they decide to go-it-alone.
- Developers place value on owning the entire customer relationship beyond what we assessed in our short-term analysis of Fortnite performance.
- PC / Console developers that have long term relationships with their customers already have a good knowledge of which users drive spend. They can directly convert those players over to the mobile version.
- Tencent ownership of influential developers might bias their choices.


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PRODUCT OFFERS - Play as backend to Galaxy Store frontend Play backend to Galaxy Store frontend - how it would work • Surface area: All Samsung-owned surface areas that facilitate download of Android mobile apps, including Galaxy Store and Game Launcher Overview • Catalog: Apps with unique functionality or offers for Samsung users • Store layout: Samsung continues to curate content and do top-level promotion Lost Play Ads revenue due to shift of Play users to Galaxy Store Mitigation: Risks and Play brand dilution Mitigations Mitigation: Samsung reverts to 1P backend and promotes Galaxy Store after deal expires Mitigation: AC PRIVILEGED // REFLECTS LEGAL ADVICE

FINANCIAL OFFERS - Lumpsum Payment

Likely 2019 net profit of Galaxy Store: -\$30M to \$60M profits

Based on extrapolating public estimates of Samsung's Korean app business

Assumptions

Samsung revenue share is 20-30%

\$24-35M Samsung net revenue in KR

Global estimate, \$M High Galaxy Store Consumer Spend \$360 \$545 \$165 \$70 Galaxy store revenue (20-30% of spend) -\$15 Payment processing cost (~3% of spend) Operating cost (~250 HC) -\$100 -\$100 \$50 -\$40 Net profit (IAPs only) \$10 Ads revenue \$10 \$60 -\$30 Total net profit (incl Ads)

250 HC OPEX to run the store

Roughly 15% size of Play team

Ads revenue: ~\$10M

Based on impressions and CTR data shared by Samsung at GDC

Link to overall proposal

Source: Korean industry articles; Samsung Galaxy Apps partner program, Play Finance Galaxy Store profit model

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Low

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